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Abstract 
Most cognitive research concerned with the relationship between language and music asks 
whether isolated individuals represent and process them in similar ways. In this paper, we 
focus instead on the relationship between interactive language and interactive music, and 
suggest that speakers engaged in dialogue and musicians engaged in joint performance face 
similar difficulties – how to relate their contributions to their partners in terms of both timing 
and content. We propose a model that spans interactive language and music in which each 
interactor constructs a single joint prediction of their own and their partner’s behaviour, and 
then compares that prediction against the actual behaviour when it occurs. We discuss how 
predictions differ depending on turn organisation, as well as message spontaneity. We relate 
this proposal to behavioural and neuroscientific data from interaction research in the domains 
of both music and language. 
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Introduction 
When considering natural interaction, the first activity to come to mind is conversation. 
However, most of us are also used to singing happy birthday with friends, or massacring pop 
duets in karaoke. Indeed both language and music are characteristic human abilities, sharing 
many apparent similarities in terms of their origins, functions, and organization. Just as 
rhythmic information is used to maintain an isochronous beat in music, it is used to establish 
a regular syllable rate in language. Just as pitch conveys the progression of a musical melody, 
it underpins the prosody of linguistic discourse. Given such similarities, we might expect 
them to be processed similarly, and indeed many researchers assume that this is the case 
(Fitch, 2006; Patel, 2003). But much prior work has focused on processing within an 
individual, looking at the passive listener or the isolated speaker or performer, as opposed to 
the interactive pair or group. We draw together research across language and music, taking 
advantage of the diversity of work focused on interpersonal coordination to identify cognitive 
processes involved in prediction during communicative interaction.  
For decades in the psychological study of production and comprehension, it has been 
assumed that an individual hearing a recording in the lab is a proxy for a conversational 
listener, and an individual speaking disconnected sentences into a microphone is a proxy for 
their talkative partner (see Clark, 1996). The use of such ‘isolation paradigms’ (Becchio, 
Sartori, & Castiello, 2010) is based on the assumption that the way an individual represents 
their own and their interaction partner’s part captures the entirety of social cognition (Fuchs 
& De Jaegher, 2009). But while theoretically two such individuals could approximate a 
conversing pair, such an approach removes the social aspect of interaction (i.e. the possibility 
of adaptation based on feedback), and cannot capture processes that emerge in the pair as a 
coupled unit. Recent developments in technology, coupled with a shift in perspective, has led 
to research exploring how individuals coordinate during the reciprocal process of sending and 
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receiving information (Schilbach et al., 2013), and particularly the neural correlates of such 
social coordination (Bögels, Barr, Garrod, & Kessler, 2015; Menenti, Pickering, & Garrod, 
2012; Noordzij et al., 2009). Here we draw from such work to address interaction processes 
across two forms of communicative interaction: language and music.  
We focus on interaction as a shared cooperative activity that involves (1) mutual 
responsiveness – i.e. each individual adapting to the other with the aim of coordinating, (2) 
commitment to the joint activity – i.e. each individual aiming to generate their own actions to 
mesh with those of the others, and (3) commitment to mutual support – i.e. willingness to 
support each other where necessary for interactive success (Bratman, 1992). The linguistic 
and musical interactions that involve shared cooperative activity can be located along two 
key dimensions. The first is turn organisation (consecutive or concurrent). In speech, 
consecutive turns are common, with average inter-turn intervals being around 250ms (Stivers 
et al., 2009). However, while the primary speaking role alternates in consecutive interaction, 
turns can overlap, and listeners frequently produce “backchannel” or supporting contributions 
during these turns (Clark, 1996). Concurrent turn production, on the other hand, occurs when 
individuals produce outputs of similar significance at the same time. In language, concurrent 
turn production primarily involves speaking the same words, but in music it can involve 
producing different (but related) outputs. People are able to synchronise both their speech and 
their music performance remarkably well during concurrent turn production (around 30ms, 
Cummins, 2003; Keller, Knoblich, & Repp, 2007).  
The second dimension of linguistic and musical interaction is message spontaneity. Both 
language and music can involve messages being improvised (spontaneously generated) or 
scripted (pre-determined), but while most speech is spontaneous (with scripted utterances 
being limited to performers), in music the dominant format is genre-dependent (e.g. classical 
music is often scripted while jazz music is often improvised). Notably, scripted interactions 
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clearly define the content to be produced by each interactor in terms of specific words or 
notes, whereas improvised interactions afford interactors autonomy over content.  
 
Forms of Interaction 
Consecutive Language: Consecutive language can be improvised (i.e. in conversation) or 
scripted (e.g. between actors). The conversation in Figure 1 is a representative example of 
spontaneous consecutive language. Characteristic of natural dialogue, in which interpretation 
of each interlocutor’s contribution depends on associated contributions by the partner, the 
conversation would not be possible to understand from either interlocutor’s contributions 
alone. Content is instead constructed jointly, for example when J begins complimenting how 
C cleans their shoes, C then explains the cleaning technique to J. While the repetitive nature 
of their speech would be unnecessary in a monologue, conversation requires interactors to 
flexibly provide, and respond to, feedback. Hence in addition to the difficulties inherent in 
planning and producing speech, individuals must monitor other interlocutors’ interruptions 
for indications of failures to understand, then use these indications to update their speech 
plans; after J signals confusion at (3), C makes a clarification at (4). J then provides a 
backchannel signal that they have understood at (5). Each individual must be responsive to 
the cues of their partner to ensure mutual understanding (see Clark, 1996).  
 
1 - J: Those shoes look nice when you keep putting stuff on them 
2 - C: Yeah I have to get another can cuz it ran out. I mean it’s almost out 
3 - J: Oh ah  
4 - C: Yeah well it cleans them and keeps    them clean 
5 - J:                  Yeah right 
 
Figure 1. Simplified conversation example from Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson (1974). 
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Consecutive Music: Consecutive music can either be scripted (i.e. precomposed) or 
improvised, and in either case the musical content can only be understood from the combined 
contributions of all musicians. Musical turn-taking is common in forms such as jazz, and 
involves many of the same issues as linguistic turn-taking. In such music, each individual’s 
contribution is influenced by that of the other(s), both in terms of structure and melodic 
features. Notably, in consecutive music production a non-soloist musician may produce 
supporting output during the partner’s turn, providing accompaniment somewhat comparably 
to a conversational listener’s backchannelling.  
 
Concurrent Language: While it is possible for individuals to produce different words 
simultaneously, language becomes very hard to understand when overlap is extensive. If two 
individuals (typically addressees) start to speak concurrently (e.g., both responding to a 
question or statement), one tends to yield the floor rapidly to the other (see Schegloff, 2000). 
Hence extended concurrent speech is unlikely to be improvised, and is typically limited to 
scripted contributions (e.g. chanting), in which case each individual’s contribution is likely to 
be very similar. Since the speech content itself is predetermined, concurrent speech can be 
constructed like a scripted monologue, though extraneous elements of speech (such as rate, 
dynamics, and stress) must be matched with others by monitoring their output and adjusting 
accordingly. 
  
Concurrent Music: Concurrent music can be scripted or improvised, and furthermore, 
multiple people can simultaneously produce the same, or different, outputs. When concurrent 
performance is scripted, each individual can construct their contribution in a similar way to 
when performing individually, but extraneous elements of production (such as timing, 
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dynamics, and phrasing) are influenced by other performers. During improvisation, content 
can also be influenced by others.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of concurrent music performance by two musicians, from Monson (1996). 
 
In Figure 2, the top musical line is the performance of a trumpeter (Freddie Hubbard), and the 
bottom musical line is the performance of a bass player (Richard Davis). While the bassist in 
this sort of improvisation often holds a crucial role in establishing the harmony and rhythm 
by playing low single-beat notes, a clear break from this tendency is evident in bars 7-8. Here 
the bassist plays triplets (3 notes per beat) as opposed to a single note per beat, mimicking the 
pattern that was previously demonstrated by the trumpeter (bars 5-6). This passing of the 
triplet pattern between the two performers demonstrates the way two individuals can develop 
a musical theme together, and illustrates the challenge for interactors to consistently 
comprehend the output (timing and content) of others while planning and producing their 
own complementary output.  
These examples have demonstrated that linguistic and musical interactions involve flexible 
adjustment based on the output of other interactors that do not arise when looking at 
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production or comprehension separately. We now focus on the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underlying such shared cooperative activities in communicative interaction. We 
begin by proposing a framework for interaction, then outline its support in previous literature, 
and finally discuss a series of questions to be addressed in future work. 
  
A Simulationist Account of Communicative Interaction 
This account extends isolationist approaches to cover the potential simultaneity of production 
and comprehension (whether turns are organised concurrently or consecutively), and includes 
a means of making predictions across self and other. We draw on the model of Pickering and 
Garrod (2013), first focusing on individual production and comprehension, and then moving 
to what changes when these processes occur in different sorts of communicative interactions.  
According to Pickering and Garrod’s (2013) theory of language, when a speaker generates a 
production command (i.e., an intention to communicate) they use a forward model to 
represent the predicted outcome of their speech before they finish producing it. The 
production command (comprising the linguistic message) is sent to the production 
implementer to initiate the utterance. At the same time, an efference copy of the production 
command is sent through a forward production model to generate a prediction of the 
upcoming output. This runs ahead of the actual production, and typically involves 
simplification of the production command. Speakers then compare what they produced with 
their predicted outcome (i.e., production percept), and any difference is fed back to update 
future predictions. This model improves the more it is used, as predictions are refined. 
Complementarily, listeners use an inverse model to predict what a speaker they are listening 
to will say next. Importantly, it is known that comprehenders interpret speech in a speaker-
specific manner (Metzing & Brennan, 2003), and hence this inverse model takes any known 
differences between themselves and the speaker into account. Specifically, when the listener 
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covertly imitates the speech that they hear to derive the production command that would have 
been required to generate it, this transformation is based on the listener’s production 
experience modified by known differences between themselves and the speaker (e.g. 
differences in vocal range). The listener then derives the production command for the 
upcoming speech using a forward model based on their own experience of talking modified 
by known differences between themselves and the speaker (e.g., different interests or speech 
habits). Similarly to individual production, the derived production command would lead to 
the generation of an expected percept, which is compared to the speech that they 
subsequently hear. Any difference would be fed back to improve the model and better tailor it 
to the specific speaker involved.  
Garrod and Pickering (2015) argue that predictions of content and predictions of timing are 
separate. The content of the message can be represented at any level (phonological, syntactic, 
semantic), with different elements being emphasised in different situations. For example, if a 
speaker starts with ‘I’m hungry, why don’t we go to…’ then their interlocutor would predict 
the semantic category of restaurant. However, only if the interlocutor knows the speaker’s 
preferences could they also accurately predict the specific phonology of ‘McDonalds’. The 
timing of the utterance, on the other hand, is incorporated into the prediction as context. 
Entrainment to the speaker’s rate of speech (e.g. one syllable every 200ms) is used in 
combination with the content prediction to make a comprehensive prediction of the upcoming 
utterance (i.e. 3 syllables of ‘McDonalds’ x 200ms/syllable = 600ms to complete the 
utterance).  
The simulation account of individual production and comprehension is also applicable to 
music, though music of course involves different representations. We follow many previous 
models of musical prediction to include representations of pitch and rhythm (Pearce & 
Wiggins, 2012). We define rhythm as the number/proportion of beats making up a note, and 
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again hold timing separately as beat-rate (i.e. tempo). To put this into a linguistic context, 
whereas words are a multiplication of syllables (and are dependent on the syllable-rate), 
musical rhythms are a multiplication of beats (and are dependent on the beat-rate). Note that 
differences in beat proportions or groupings are therefore a feature of rhythm, while 
variations in the placement of beats are a feature of timing (i.e. being early/late). Hence 
where the language model represents phonology, the music model represents pitch and 
rhythm. Furthermore, where the language model represents syntax, the music model 
represents the higher order organisation of pitch and rhythm, i.e., tonality and metre.  
So far, the account of production and comprehension refers to monologue speaking or 
listening. However, interactions differ from individual production or comprehension in two 
ways: the dependence of consecutive outputs, and the interrelation of simultaneously 
occurring outputs. The dependence of consecutive outputs is based on the premise that 
cooperative shared activity involves mutual responsiveness, and hence that each individual 
can assume interdependence of contributions (i.e. that a partner’s contribution will build on 
one’s own contribution). The interrelation of simultaneously occurring outputs is based on 
the requirement to produce and comprehend at the same time; for example, when overlap 
occurs at turn-ends, when the listening individual interjects, or during concurrent turn 
production. 
We propose that within an interaction, participants compute joint predictions, which involve 
a single integrated representation of both self and other. While the means of generating 
predictions are the same as in individual production or individual comprehension, an 
additional step is required to integrate these predictions into a single representation before 
they are compared with the resulting interaction output. Note that this process is proposed to 
underlie well-coordinated and successful interactions, when individuals are able to generate 
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accurate predictions about both themselves and their interaction partner; it may not occur 
when predictions are repeatedly violated. 
Integration of self and other predictions occur both across consecutive contributions and 
during simultaneous contributions. In terms of integrating predictions of consecutive 
contributions, the cooperative nature of the interaction leads each individual to simulate their 
own contributions in relation to those of their partner as a high-level integrated 
representation. It is this integrated prediction that leads an interlocutor to expect that their 
question will be answered or that their antecedent phrase will be followed by a consequent 
phrase. It is also this integrated prediction that is violated if such events do not occur.     
In terms of integrating predictions of simultaneously occurring contributions, the generation 
of a single joint prediction to use as a template against which to compare the joint output is a 
cognitively efficient means of monitoring interaction success. In concurrent turn 
organisation, i.e. choric language or a duet, the joint representation might include 
performance asynchrony as a difference between self and other (e.g. self being 50ms before 
other) as opposed to each individual’s timing as an absolute value (e.g., self at 250ms and 
other at 300ms). In a duet the joint representation of content might also include pitch as a 
relationship between self and other, for example predicting a C major chord as opposed to 
oneself playing a C while a partner plays an E and a G. This joint prediction mechanism uses 
individual production and comprehension processes to generate individual predictions 
(comprehension processes again being tailored to the specific interactor), but then combines 
these predictions into a single joint prediction percept. Integrating the self and other 
predictions allows monitoring and repair more efficiently than multiple separate simultaneous 
predictions (i.e. one for each interactor) being first compared with each individual’s output, 
and subsequently compared with each other to identify inter-individual mismatches. The 
reason for making a joint prediction (e.g., of a C major chord rather than a C, plus an E and a 
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G) is largely to reduce computational complexity (i.e., one prediction being made rather than 
two).  
Importantly, however, there are times when people rely on individual rather than joint 
predictions when predicting simultaneously occurring contributions. Reliance on individual 
predictions may occur when joint predictions are often inaccurate, for example when the joint 
output includes frequent errors or inter-personal temporal instability. In such cases, 
identifying which part of the joint prediction was violated may be more complex than 
comparing each individual’s prediction against each individual’s output. Hence in such cases 
it would be more cognitively efficient to predict the individuals rather than the dyad. Even 
during one interaction, predictions may fluctuate between being joint and individual, 
potentially shifting from individual to joint as familiarity increases and predictions become 
more accurate, or shifting from joint to individual during periods of poor coordination. (Note 
that predictions across consecutive turns are always integrated, because each contribution is 
interdependent by virtue of being part of the shared cooperative interaction activity.) 
Joint predictions relate to a behaviour (specifically, a joint behaviour) and are therefore 
“external” (relating to output). In addition, individuals make “internal” predictions about the 
sensorimotor experience of their own production. Notably, if sensorimotor predictions of 
one’s own contribution are violated it may be possible to correct potential errors before they 
are output, which is not possible for “external” joint predictions (since the joint percept is 
required for monitoring). These internal predictions only relate to one’s own output (because 
people do not have access to their partner’s experience), and can provide additional 
information for identifying the agent of an error perceived in the joint output. For example, 
take the case of musicians playing a duet together at a fixed tempo, during which one 
musician comes in late. The joint prediction would be of simultaneous performance, and 
would be violated by the asynchrony of the entries. If this asynchrony were due to the first 
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musician’s mistake, her internal prediction would also be violated, allowing attribution of the 
error to herself. On the other hand, if this asynchrony were due to her partner’s mistake, her 
internal prediction would not have been violated. It is important to note that if the interaction 
constraints are unspecified, for example when playing a piece without a tempo marking, 
violations of joint predictions could alternatively indicate that interactors’ assumptions of the 
overarching context mismatch. In such a situation both individuals may have fulfilled their 
internal predictions, but their different understandings of the context meant that their 
contributions produced an error when occurring in combination. 
Context is the general knowledge that one interactor uses to inform their predictions across 
the interaction (i.e. including both interactors). In music, this could be an understanding of 
tempo or musical genre; in language, this could be an understanding of speech-rate or 
conversation topic. Notably, each interacting individual has their own representation of this 
overarching context, and of course these representations may be different. If there is evidence 
of mismatch between the outputs of two musicians that can be attributed to different 
understandings of general knowledge underlying the interaction, representation of the context 
can be adjusted appropriately. Representing the context thus allows efficient updating of 
parameters affecting prediction of the interaction as a whole. (We ignore the question of 
whether both interlocutors need to know that the knowledge is shared; see Clark, 1996). 
Below we sketch a model focusing on how self and other representations are combined in 
interactive music and language. See Figure 3, illustrating the simplest and optimal case of the 
joint prediction mechanism for two interactors. 
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Figure 3. The processes used by Person A during an ideal interaction with Person B 
(involving music or language). In both music and language the production command is the 
intention underlying an individual’s output (i.e. their produced speech or music 
performance). Person A produces her contribution (thick black uppermost arrow) while 
additionally predicting the contribution of Person B, with the full lines from production 
commands to the predicted joint percept indicating forward modelling of the production 
commands. The predicted joint percept is compared with the joint heard percept, and dotted 
lines indicate how feedback from this comparison is used to update the forward models (of 
either A or B) directly, or via context, in order to improve prediction accuracy and A’s own 
outputs. Person B’s contribution is shown in the thick grey lowermost arrow. 
  
In this model, person A is both producing and comprehending (person B is doing the same 
but their full model is not shown). As described above, when A sends a production command 
she uses a forward model to predict the outcome of that production. Additionally, when she 
comprehends B she uses covert imitation and forward modelling to derive the production 
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command that B will use for his upcoming contribution. The means of generating these 
predictions are the same as for individual production and comprehension, but what differs in 
interaction is how the result of these (production and comprehension) predictions are 
compared with what is heard. Following the generation of these individual predictions, they 
are integrated into a single joint representation. Only when there is a mismatch between this 
prediction and the heard output (and one’s internal prediction is not violated) would the joint 
prediction be decomposed into its constituent parts (i.e. self, other), to identify the locus of 
the error. Let’s consider how this works in consecutive and concurrent turn organisation, each 
time from person A’s perspective. 
 
Consecutive interaction 
Person A is engaged in a turn-taking interaction with Person B. Given the shared cooperative 
nature of the interaction, she expects that he will be responsive to her turns and that he is 
committed to interaction success. Hence while listening to person B, A covertly imitates him 
and predicts what he will produce next. As B is coming to the end of his turn and hence A has 
finished generating predictions about his output, she begins to generate the production 
commands for the start of her own contribution. Then as A’s own contribution comes to an 
end, she predicts how B might respond. Though A makes predictions about her own and her 
partner’s parts slightly differently (forward modelling for self-production, covert imitation 
followed by forward modelling for other-prediction), self and other predictions are integrated 
into a prediction of the interaction as a whole, based on the principles of shared cooperative 
activity. If responsiveness and coherence are not upheld, A may reconsider her categorisation 
of the situation as an interaction, and adjust her expectations to those of an individual 
monologue (e.g., in which interjections are not necessarily answered). 
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During each individual’s turn, it is likely that the other provides a backchannel or supporting 
function. Note that this does not constitute a concurrent turn because of the asymmetry of 
content and relative salience of the contributions. Nonetheless, such simultaneous 
productions are also included in the integrated prediction of the consecutive turn situation, 
though these interjections may be simulated at a more abstract level than the turn itself (i.e. in 
language this simulation could be of an affirmation without specifying whether it will be 
‘yes’ or ‘right’; in music this simulation could be of a particular harmony without specifying 
the individual note sequence). If predictions of the supporting partner’s output are relatively 
abstract, violations will occur only when the mismatch is critical to interaction success (e.g. if 
the interlocutor queries the speaker rather than agreeing, or the accompanist produces a 
harmonic/metric clash). 
Notably, if A and B are interacting smoothly, there should be little difference between A’s 
joint prediction and the actual joint output. On the other hand, if A and B are not interacting 
smoothly, A’s joint prediction will often clash with the actual joint output, leading to 
different parts of the model being updated depending on the reason for the error.  
 
Consecutive Language: To demonstrate how an individual would predict a conversation 
partner, we refer to a real example. In the discussion between a public relations officer and an 
engineer following a hurricane in Figure 4, Person A gives a request for information at (1) 
which B appears to respond to adequately at (2). However, during (2) an error is signalled by 
A’s monitor because while she predicted that both herself and her partner would use the term 
ones to refer to roads, the joint output shows that B actually used ones to refer to shelters. 
The misunderstanding of the referent of ones is therefore fed back to update A’s 
representation of the context (i.e. the general knowledge that she uses to inform her 
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predictions of herself and B), which leads her to update her upcoming production command 
to allow clarification at (3).  
 
1 - A: Which ones are closed, an’ which ones are open 
2 - B: (pointing to map) Most of ‘em. This, this, this, this 
3 - A: I don’t mean on the shelters, I mean on the roads 
4 - B: Oh! 
 
Figure 4. Simplified conversation example from Schegloff (1987). 
 
Consecutive Music: In music involving turn-taking, many of the same issues from 
conversation occur. In an improvisation between A and B, A would play her turn and when 
coming towards the end, begin to predict B’s response. If B doesn’t respond as anticipated, 
for example by introducing a new theme rather than providing a variation of A’s theme, A 
may update her model of his improvisation style (i.e. A’s understanding of the differences 
between herself and B). Alternatively, if B does provide a variation of her theme but 
unexpectedly modulates to a different key, A may not only update her understanding of 
differences between herself and B (in terms of harmonic style), and also her representation of 
the context (i.e., updating the musical key as this will affect both his and her own upcoming 
contributions).  
Importantly, B may interject during A’s turn. A could include this accompaniment 
(somewhat akin to linguistic backchanneling) in her joint prediction. She may predict that B 
will interject with the harmonic progression that she is performing to emphasise specific 
beats. Similarly, she can make predictions about her own output when she accompanies B’s 
turn. Hence there are points that she will anticipate a simultaneous output, even though the 
turn structure is consecutive. 
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Notably, the explicit beat structure of music does lead to some differences between music and 
language interaction. Unlike language, it is rare to correct a musical error (i.e. attempting the 
note again), because this would disrupt the musical flow and may shift the temporal pattern 
of the melody to the wrong beat. So while in certain cases self-corrections can be made 
during performance (e.g. if a note on the violin is flat, it can be sharpened while it is being 
produced), in many cases errors are left uncorrected with commands for upcoming content 
being adjusted instead. 
 
Concurrent interaction 
In this situation, both individuals concurrently produce and listen to their combined output at 
all times. Person A predicts how her upcoming contribution will feel to produce (internal 
prediction), as well as how her own and B’s contribution will sound in a single representation 
of the joint output (external prediction). As in consecutive production, A’s prediction of B 
takes into account known differences between the two individuals. Any violations of this 
joint representation are fed back to update the relevant part of the model.  
Concurrent Language: When chanting at a football match, individuals produce the same 
content at the same time ‘We’re going to win, 3-nil, 3-nil’. However, there may be 
interpersonal variation in content, for example some fans being more optimistic than others 
(‘We’re going to win, 5-nil, 5-nil’). Assuming that each individual predicts that their version 
of the chant will be spoken by all, such differences would lead to an error signal between the 
predicted joint percept and the actual joint percept. While too late to alter the words already 
spoken, this error signal could be used to update the representation of the context (e.g., to 
converge on ‘4-nil, 4-nil’) and hence alter one’s production commands for the upcoming 
repeat. Aside from content (which in most cases should be the same during concurrent turn 
production in language), individuals monitor for mismatch in terms of temporal, dynamic, or 
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other acoustic features of the sound. For example, in terms of timing, if B begins the word 
‘win’ earlier than A, A would recognise an error between her prediction of a simultaneous 
joint utterance, and the actual output, and could update her representation of speech-rate in 
her context representation. It is important to note, however, that the way that such a mismatch 
between a joint prediction and joint percept is dealt with may vary depending on the role of 
the individual. When each interactor holds an equal role in the interaction they may both 
update their representations of context to converge on a compromise between their starting 
tempi, but when each interactors holds a different role - A being the coach and B being a fan 
- A may continue without adjustment while B adjusts to match A.  
Concurrent Music: If performers A and B are playing monophonically (i.e. they play the 
same notes at the same time), then each performer’s joint prediction would be for a pair of 
notes to occur simultaneously, at the same pitch and for the same duration. A would predict 
her own part using her forward model of herself, and predict B’s part using her forward 
model of B taking into account knowledge of differences between herself and B. For 
example, if A knew that B was less skilled than her, she may use a subset of her performance 
experience to predict B’s upcoming contribution. In this case she may rely on her own 
performance experience from when she was less skilled, in order to identify potential times of 
difficulty for B, and prepare her own contribution sympathetically (i.e. wait longer to produce 
her note if she anticipates B will have difficulty finding his).  
In a smooth interaction, the notes of A and B would occur at the same time (i.e. within 
bounds of acceptable temporal synchrony), and no error would be recorded by the monitor. 
But if there is a temporal error, an error would be elicited. For example, A and B may be 
playing a piece with a predetermined tempo of one beat every 500ms (i.e., this is the tempo 
marking on the score). If A played note 2 at timepoint 500ms but B played it at 600ms, 
several of A’s joint predictions would be violated: her prediction of two simultaneous notes 
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(joint prediction), and her prediction that the two notes would both be based on a beat lasting 
500ms. At this point, A would disambiguate the difference between her predicted joint 
percept and the actual joint percept according to whose contribution was whose (referring to 
her internal model as well), and the monitor would identify the error being between A’s 
prediction for B (that B would play at the 500ms timepoint), and B’s output. Given that the 
tempo had been previously specified, A would identify B’s performance as an error (this 
tempo is represented in A’s context representation), and would continue playing ‘correctly’ 
(without adjusting her performance), assuming B would adjust his performance 
appropriately. A similar thing could happen if the error were pitch-based in a pre-composed 
piece (i.e. if B played out of key): again, A could continue and expect B to fix his own errors.  
If, however, the tempo or notes of the piece could be negotiated between musicians (i.e. in a 
piece with no specific tempo, or an improvisation), any differences between musicians could 
be handled differently. In the piece without a predetermined tempo, A may instead take the 
difference between her predicted tempo and person B’s starting tempo to update her model of 
context, for example altering her representation of beat duration from 500ms per beat to 
550ms per beat. She would use this to adjust her subsequent performance commands and 
predictions of B. However, which musician(s) adjust may again be based on roles within the 
interaction (primary/accompanying instrument), and would result in the generation of 
leader/follower relationships. The closer A and B’s representations of context become, the 
smoother the interaction, as interpersonal predictions become more accurate. 
 
Other features impacting interaction 
We propose that this model spans both scripted and improvised interactions, and familiar and 
unfamiliar partners, but do not claim that contributions are predicted in the same way 
between contexts. When interactions are scripted, and the script for each interactor is known 
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by both, the joint prediction will be highly specified for both individuals. In such a case, A 
may predict the stylistic aspects (such as accent, dynamics, or temporal variability) of B’s 
output as well as the specific words/notes he will produce, though the accuracy of these 
predictions will depend on A’s familiarity with B’s style. When B is familiar and A can use a 
well-tuned model to predict B’s output, then A’s predictions will be highly accurate. When B 
is unfamiliar, on the other hand, and A cannot use a well-tuned model to predict B’s output, 
A’s predictions are instead based on her own idiosyncratic model, which may turn out to be 
highly inaccurate.  
Hence knowing the content of a partner’s contribution does not necessarily improve fine-
grained temporal prediction, although it may improve larger-scale predictions based on the 
linguistic or musical structure (Ragert, Schroeder, & Keller, 2013). Instead fine-grained 
temporal predictions improve as the partner’s style becomes more familiar and one’s model 
of that partner becomes better calibrated (Ragert et al., 2013). In a similar way, improvised 
interactions may involve less specific, or more flexible, predictions  (Bianco, Novembre, 
Keller, Villringer, & Sammler, 2018), and these may improve through familiarity with a 
partner’s improvisation style. 
 
Support for the Model 
The three main claims of our model presented above are: 
1) Individuals generate a single prediction percept combining both interactors 
2) Predictions of other interactors are made via simulation 
3) Similar representations of context between interactors improves coordination 
Evidence for these claims will be discussed in turn. 
1. Do we generate a single prediction percept combining both interactors? 
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The model proposes that in cooperative joint actions we don’t just generate two individual 
prediction percepts – one ‘self’ and one ‘other’ – but instead generate a single combined 
prediction percept that is based on the contributions of both interactors. While there is little 
research that directly addresses this issue, there are reasons to support this proposal. Initial 
evidence comes from individuals representing the contribution of their partners as well as 
themselves, a premise that has support across joint action research (including work on 
language). Further evidence for this claim comes from individuals prioritising the shared goal 
of an interaction over either individual’s goal.  
A variety of joint action paradigms have been used to show co-representation of a partner. 
Many studies have demonstrated interference between one’s own and another individual’s 
action using the joint Simon task, in which the standard Simon task is shared across two 
people (each taking one response button) (Dolk et al., 2014). In the Simon task, two types of 
target stimuli are presented on the left or the right side of a computer screen. One type of 
target should be responded to with the left hand, and the other type of target should be 
responded to with the right. When a target appears on the same side of the screen as its 
response mapping, performance is facilitated. When the target appears on the opposite side as 
its response mapping, performance is impaired. In the joint Simon task, two participants sit 
next to each other, each responding to different types of target (each with only one hand). 
Sitting next to an individual responding to the ‘other’ cue elicits behavioural and neural 
interference in a similar way to when responding to both cues oneself (Sebanz, Knoblich, & 
Prinz, 2003), indicating that both individuals’ actions are represented.  
There is also evidence that prediction about one’s own and another’s actions are combined in 
naturalistic situations. A study investigating lifting and balancing found that a participant find 
it easier to keep a tray balanced while lifting a glass from someone else’s tray when that other 
person simultaneously, rather than sequentially, lifts a glass from the participant’s own tray 
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(Pezzulo, Iodice, Donnarumma, Dindo, & Knoblich, 2017). This suggests that representing 
one’s own action is easily translated to another, and facilitates one’s response to that other 
individual’s action. Furthermore, in a study of lifting and clinking glasses (Kourtis, Knoblich, 
Woźniak, & Sebanz, 2014), when lifting a glass to the centre of the table, participants showed 
greater neural activation when they were to clink with another person than when they were 
acting alone, demonstrating the influence of predicting others on one’s own action 
representation. 
There is also evidence of co-representation of a partner’s speech. Individuals take longer to 
name pictures when they believe that both themselves and their partner are naming pictures at 
the same time (Gambi, Van de Cavey, & Pickering, 2015). The fact that the partner’s task 
interfered with the participant’s own suggests that individuals represent the speech of their 
partners during an interactive task. Similar effects of a partner’s speech on one’s own have 
been demonstrated in a semantic interference task (Kuhlen & Rahman, 2017), and neural 
evidence for co-representing partner in a go/no-go picture naming task indicates lexical 
processing for both one’s own and a partner’s spoken response (Baus et al., 2014).  
While in both music and language it is difficult to differentiate a joint prediction from 
multiple individual predictions, concurrent production allows the issue to be addressed 
directly. Turning to research in musical interaction, it has been found that when musicians 
know both parts of a (concurrent) duet piece, they adjust the temporal profile of their own 
performance according to the complexity of their partner’s part (Loehr & Palmer, 2011), 
suggesting a focus on the joint outcome. Furthermore, when feedback is manipulated in 
duetting musicians’ parts that either violate only their individual goals (i.e. to perform their 
own part correctly) or additionally violate their shared goal (i.e. to perform a harmonically 
coherent musical piece), neural responses differ (Loehr, Kourtis, Vesper, Sebanz, & 
Knoblich, 2013). The P300, indicating updating of context (Donchin & Coles, 1988) is 
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enhanced when the shared goal (i.e. the harmonic structure of the piece) is violated compared 
to when either individual’s goal is violated. This finding indicates prediction of the joint 
outcome, i.e. that both musical lines are integrated into a joint prediction of the harmonic 
pattern that they make in combination, with the mismatch between this joint prediction and 
the real percept eliciting disruption.  
Indeed, concurrent music performance (in which musicians play different musical lines) 
offers the possibility of attending to a combined interaction outcome, but it is also possible to 
prioritise individual contributions within this combined output. Keller’s Prioritised 
Integrative Attending theory specifies that attentional weighting can vary in such a situations, 
with prioritisation of one’s own part within such a performance being optimal (Keller, 1999). 
An elegant study tested how interpersonal entrainment accuracy in a piano duet affected self-
other integration (Novembre, Sammler, & Keller, 2016). Pairs of pianists played duets while 
alpha activity, hypothesised to be involved in integrating representations of self and other, 
was recorded. Importantly, alpha suppression has been linked to increased cognitive 
processing efficiency (Klimesch, 2012), and hence was used as a measure of successful self-
other integration. When musicians were well entrained and performing together 
synchronously, alpha activity was indeed suppressed, indicating integration of self-other 
predictions. However, when musicians were poorly entrained and performing together 
asynchronously, alpha activity was enhanced, indicating reduced integration of self-other 
predictions. This dissociation supports our proposal that when joint predictions are frequently 
erroneous (such as during the asynchronous performance), each individual’s predictions are 
held separate.  
2. Do people make predictions about interactors via simulation?  
There are strong indications that people indeed use simulation to coordinate with a partner 
during interaction (though often this has been tested with non-adaptive interaction partners). 
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Evidence for the use of simulation in language comes from a joint picture naming task 
(Gambi, Cop, & Pickering, 2015). Participants took turns to name images that were 
occasionally replaced by a different target picture during naming. The target picture signalled 
that they should stop naming the original image, and either that they, their partner, or neither, 
should name the new image. Strikingly, the original speaker was more likely to finish naming 
the original picture regardless of whether it was their role to name the target or their 
partner’s, compared to when it was neither of their roles. Such interference suggests motor 
activation occurs similarly for both one’s own speech and that of an interaction partner. 
Furthermore, in a go/no-go picture naming task that varied whether the participant or a 
confederate should respond, the participants showed greater inhibition during the 
confederate’s responses, indicating motor system involvement (Baus et al., 2014).   
Moreover, evidence from music suggests that our predictions of others involve simulation 
(Novembre, Ticini, Schutz-Bosbach, & Keller, 2012), and that these simulations are based on 
the idiosyncrasies of our own motor performance. For example, pianists are better at 
detecting perturbations in their own performances than those of others (Repp & Keller, 
2010), and are also better at synchronising with a previous recording of themselves than a 
previous recording of another pianist (Keller et al., 2007). Furthermore, while we might 
expect pianists to benefit from familiarity with the partner’s part in a duet, when pianists have 
practiced the other part of a piano duet themselves they are actually worse at subsequently 
synchronising with another pianist playing it (Ragert et al., 2013). This suggests that they use 
their own experience to predict their duet partner, and without knowledge of how they and 
their partner differ, these erroneous predictions lead to impaired synchronisation. 
The more similar we are to somebody, the better we are at synchronising with them. 
Individuals with similar spontaneous performance rates are able to synchronise more 
accurately than individuals with dissimilar spontaneous performance rates (Loehr & Palmer, 
 26 
2011; Zamm, Pfordresher, & Palmer, 2015), with performance asynchrony being correlated 
with the difference in the spontaneous rates chosen by the performers. In other words, even 
during attempts at coordination, spontaneous rate affects asynchrony. Furthermore, musicians 
with similar performance rates show mutual adaptation in duet performances, as opposed to 
falling into a leader-follower-type relationship (in which one performer dominates, Loehr & 
Palmer, 2011). These findings are consistent with predictions being based on one’s own 
motor experience, because when interactors are more similar their predictions will be more 
accurate and adjustments more beneficial.  
Moreover, two recent studies of musical duets showed a causal role of simulation for 
coordination accuracy, both for consecutive (Hadley et al., 2015) and concurrent (Giacomo 
Novembre, Ticini, Schütz-Bosbach, & Keller, 2014) turn organisation. In these studies, 
musicians were given either both parts of a duet, or only their own part of a duet, to 
memorise. One part of the duet was played with the right hand, one with the left. They then 
came into the lab and played only one part of each duet in time with an audiovisual recording 
of another pianist. Applying double pulse TMS to motor regions relating to the participant’s 
unused hand (i.e. the hand that the partner was using) either around a tempo change, or a 
turn-switch, caused performance disruption for the participant’s own part only when they had 
previously practiced their partner’s part. The motor regions targeted had been implicated in 
previous research on simulation (Lahav, Saltzman, & Schlaug, 2007), and so it appears that 
such simulation is involved in coordinating with a partner. More specifically, when playing 
with a partner whose actions are strongly encoded in one’s own motor system (due to direct 
experience of producing their part), this simulation mechanism (involving the dorsal 
premotor cortex) is causally involved in accurate coordination. 
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3. Do similar context representations between interactors improve 
coordination?  
In speech, context includes one’s general knowledge about the content; in music, context 
includes one’s understanding of musical features such as harmony and rhythm. In both 
speech and music, context includes one’s understanding of rate or tempo. We previously 
suggested that similar understandings of context would facilitate interaction due to 
interpersonal predictions becoming more accurate. Indeed when two musicians have similar 
representations of context in terms of upcoming tempo changes, they play more 
synchronously even in the preceding phrases (Novembre et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
simulation is enhanced during observation of a partner when more information about context 
is available; pianists show enhanced responses when observing mute piano performances 
including incongruent musical progressions in 5-chord sequences compared to 2-chord 
sequences (Sammler et al., 2013). As it is also evident that interacting individuals align on 
features such as rate of production over time (Cohen Priva, Edelist, & Gleason, 2017; 
Finlayson, Lickley, & Corley, 2012; Jungers & Hupp, 2009;  Schultz et al., 2016), we 
speculate that successful interaction results from a predictive simulation mechanism that 
makes use of interactors’ representations of context (Colling & Williamson, 2014). 
Furthermore, we propose neural synchrony as a neural marker of similar context 
representations. 
Neural coupling between interacting individuals has been demonstrated in both linguistic and 
musical interactions. In a study of conversation that recorded neural activity from both 
interactors, oscillations synchronised between the speaker and the listener during turn-taking 
speech (Pérez, Carreiras, & Duñabeitia, 2017), while in concurrent music performance, 
musicians show increased phase synchronisation around the onset of a music performance 
when cued by a metronome (Lindenberger, Li, Gruber, & Müller, 2009), even when playing 
 28 
different musical lines (i.e. polyphonically; Sänger, Müller, & Lindenberger, 2013). Notably, 
such interpersonal entrainment is influenced by the relationship between the interactors. In a 
musical interaction, neural coupling at 12Hz from the leader to the follower but not from 
follower to leader, is greater after, compared to before, note onsets (Sänger et al., 2013), 
potentially indicating that followers adjust their representation of context to the leader 
following each musical event.  
If similar understanding of context contributes to interaction success, there should be a 
relationship between neural synchronisation and behavioural measures reflecting this success. 
Indeed, neural coupling between speakers and listeners relates to their ability to make 
predictions about what will come next (Dikker, Silbert, Hasson, & Zevin, 2014) and to the 
level of comprehension during the interaction (Stephens, Silbert, & Hasson, 2010). 
Furthermore, a study of speech rhythm showed that the amplitude of entrained alpha and 
theta activity correlates with interpersonal synchronisation accuracy (Kawasaki, Yamada, 
Ushiku, Miyauchi, & Yamaguchi, 2013), and in music, phase alignment between the brains 
of interacting musicians correlates with their play-onset synchrony (Lindenberger et al., 
2009).  
Strong evidence of a causal relationship between synchronisation of neural processes and 
interaction success comes from a recent transcranial stimulation study investigating finger 
tapping. Novembre and colleagues (Novembre, Knoblich, Dunne, & Keller, 2017) induced 
synchronised or non-synchronised beta oscillations between pairs of individuals engaged in a 
rhythmic finger-tapping task using transcranial alternating current stimulation. When 
stimulation induced synchronised beta activity over the left centro-parietal area, participants’ 
first few finger taps were more synchronised than when they experienced sham stimulation. 
Accuracy did not improve when unsynchronised beta activity was induced, or when 
synchronised alpha activity was induced, indicating a specific role of beta synchronisation in 
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interpersonal coordination. Further study of the relationship between beta synchronisation 
and interaction success, particularly in relation to tempo in concurrent music or language 
production, could elucidate the role of this phenomenon.  
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
We have presented a framework for communicative interaction that specifies a means by 
which interactors can share representations, predict actions, and integrate predicted effects of 
their own and others’ actions - the fundamental requirements for performing joint action 
(Keller, 2014; Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). This simulationist model provides the 
novel possibility of predicting multiple interactors’ contributions jointly (as a single percept), 
and furthermore implements a context component to efficiently update parameters of the 
interaction that affect all involved in a single step. This model covers how individuals can 
both establish and maintain synchrony, and is speculatively linked to recent literature on 
neural synchronisation during interaction. 
It is now necessary to test the hypotheses relating to this model, and situations in which it 
applies. Most notably, this model proposes each interactor predicts one joint percept 
including the contributions of both interactors. Perhaps the simplest test of such a proposal is 
how individuals deal with a violation of the predicted percept when it is due to one 
individual’s error, or both individuals’ errors. If a joint percept is predicted (as we propose), 
it should not matter if the error is due to one or both individuals, but if two individual 
percepts are predicted, errors committed by two individuals would cause more disruption 
than errors committed by one. Importantly, internal predictions would need to be considered, 
and matched across conditions. This would mean comparing the response to one’s own error 
with the response to one’s own plus a partner’s error. 
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In addition, the model proposes that similar context representations are causally involved in 
interaction success. Evidence to support this supposition was drawn from studies indicating 
that synchronised neural oscillations relate to temporal coordination in finger tapping, music, 
and speech studies. However, neural coupling (and behavioural entrainment) can also be 
understood in terms of dynamic systems theory (Schmidt, Carello, & Turvey, 1990), which 
proposes that interacting systems become aligned over time due to general laws of attraction. 
A potential way to test whether similar neural signatures indicate similar understandings of 
context would be to measure neural activity prior to interaction when interactors are given the 
same or different contextual information (presumably relating to tempo). If neural 
oscillations are used proactively, then neural activity between individuals with the same 
understanding of context should be more strongly synchronised before interaction begins than 
individuals with different understandings of context. In addition, novel paradigms should be 
developed to identify whether neural synchronisation occurs predictively for contextual 
information such as semantic understanding.  
Finally, the sorts of interaction that this model serves should be tested. We have focused on 
shared cooperative activity (Bratman, 1992), as this is the simplest form of linguistic and 
musical interaction, but there has recently been a wealth of recent research into intra-personal 
synchronisation in cooperation vs competition (Balconi & Vanutelli, 2017). Since individuals 
in a cooperative context show greater synchronisation than those in a competitive context 
(Cui, Bryant, & Reiss, 2012), whether the model we have presented is specific to cooperative 
activity should be tested. Finally, we did not consider how the model scales up to larger 
numbers of interactors. It is common to chat or chant in a group, or play music in an 
orchestra, but when predicting the output of multiple others does one simulate the average of 
the group, the most dominant individual, or each individual separately? 
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We have argued that comparing musical and linguistic interactions allows basic prediction 
mechanisms to be investigated in an ecologically valid yet highly controlled manner. We 
have presented a framework providing numerous testable hypotheses for future investigation, 
in order to advance understanding of communicative joint action and improve understanding 
of interpersonal prediction more generally. We intend the framework that we have presented 
to assist with this exploration of the mechanisms of interaction. 
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